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II. Reflections on 
the 20th Congress
The 20th Congress o f  the C om m unist Party o f  the Soviet Union took place in February 1956, 
nearly three years after the death o f  Stalin. A t  the tim e o f  the Congress, the main interest as 
reflected in the western m edia centred on the new emerging Soviet leadership, headed by the 
ebullient N ikita  Sergeievich Khrushchov.
But the Congress turned out to be fa r  more than a ritua lfor parading new leaders. It dealt in a 
new way with such questions as the possibility o f  preventing world war, socialist democracy, 
diverse roads to socialism including peaceful transition, relations am ong socialist countries and  
overcoming the consequences o f  the "cult o f  personality" o f  Stalin.
A n d  a tim e-bom b had been set ticking at the Congress. A t a "closed session" fr o m  which 
foreign delegates and journalists had been excluded, Khrushchov had delivered his fa m o u s  
"secret speech". News o f  this speech at fir s t gradually filte red  ou t until, by a process that is still 
unknow n, the N ew  York Times obtained a copy and  pub lished  it in fu ll.
The "secret speech" was never pub lished  in the U SSR , bu t it was read ou t to closed meetings o f  
party members. Outside the U SSR  its publication had  an electrifying effect on com m unist 
parties, revealing as it d id  som ething o f  the enorm ous pow er that had becom e concentrated in 
Stalin's hands and the abuse o f  that power.
Reactions to the 20th Congress included resentment that the revelations should  have been 
made at all, a ttem pts to stifle real discussion on the implications o f  the Congress, 
disillusionment and  an exodus o f  members fro m  com m unist parties, and genuine attem pts to 
debate the issues and  ex tend  the debate in a creative way. The approaches o f  the various parties 
was to have a p ro fo u n d  effect on their fu tures.
The fo llo w in g  article is a reflection by veteran Italian com m unist leader Gian Carlo Pajetta, 
written at the tim e o f  polem ics earlier this year between the C P SU  and the Italian C om m unist 
Party. It was pub lished  in the Italian com m unist weekly journa l Rinascita o f  M arch 5, 1982 and  
has been translated and edited by Dave Davies.
The 20th Congress of the Soviet communist 
party — even if it has been deleted from the 
history books in several socialist countries — 
represents a turning point which cannot be 
removed or forgotten.
Its great importance, the hopes it raised and 
dashed, are being felt today in current events. 
It is felt in the state of more or less latent crisis 
in those countries which did not want to
proceed along the road opened up by the 20th 
Congress and make adequate use of the break 
it made.
The Congress of 1956 was certainly a 
traum a for the whole communist movement: 
because of the way it was conducted it came as 
a complete surprise. Even the way in which 
Khrushchov's "secret speech" came to us was 
strange, because it was not known how it
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came to be published in the outside world and 
many communist parties kept on calling it 
"the so-called secret speech", almost doubting 
its authenticity.
The clumsy way in which the crimes of 
Stalin were revealed and condemned were of 
concern to some as a sign of "crudity" and a 
lack of analysis of the causes and methods 
behind the degeneration of the life of that 
system. But it is difficult to imagine how the 
20th Congress could have had a decisive effect 
or brought about a real turn in events without 
it happening as it did, with all its clumsiness 
and "crudity".
But for the Italian communists (and, I 
believe, not only for them) one thing was 
clear. In order that such a trauma should have 
a salutary effect and help work out a different 
perspective, it was not just a matter of 
correcting some errors or of making 
condemnations in vague terms such as "cult of 
personality" or pointing purely to individual 
responsibility (of Stalin, Beria, Abakumov or 
others). It was necessary to look back with 
courage, to comprehend the historical origins 
and the reasons for what Togliatti called 
precisely the degeneration of the system.
A quarter of a century later we must say 
that those responsible for the policies of the 
socialist countries have not gone ahead along 
the road but have, in more than one way, gone 
backwards. If Khrushchov's denunciation 
seemed to some to be "crude" or inadequate, 
today in those countries it seems even illicit, 
an episode, a personal initiative which is 
better forgotten.
At the same time, someone (perhaps 
regretting that the "secret report" had 
revealed those terrible truths) reproached the 
Italian communists for wanting to probe and 
uncover events of a past that was too recent 
and too fresh; today that past is regarded as 
"too distant" to be talked about. The name of 
Khrushchov has been deleted. How many 
people know that in the film of Togliatti 's 
funeral that we presented to the Soviet 
comrades, the frames showing the then
General Secretary of the CPSU lifting the 
coffin have been cut?
The need for change
The 20th Congress was not a passing event. 
Three years previously, at the time of Stalin's 
death, it was immediately clear to the Soviet 
leading group that things had to change. 
Moreover, 1 believe that this conviction of a 
need for change had already matured during 
the last period of Stalin's life.
In any case, it is certain that in 1953 the idea 
that there had to be a change asserted itself 
within the leading group as a whole. (This was 
said even by Molotov in information which 
must remain confidential.) It was not just a 
matter of a return to legality, of seeking to 
emerge from a state of arbitrariness and 
generalised terror. It was to reform economic 
management, social relations above all in the 
countryside and  policies on national 
minorities. (In the previous years several 
autonomous republics had been abolished.)
And yet, in those years, the problems were 
confronted only with partial measures, 
without going to their roots. That which was 
positive, and it was not just a little, seemed 
fragmentary, partial. The fundamental 
problem, moreover, could only be resolved 
w ith  w ide  p u b l i c i t y ,  w ith  p o p u la r  
participation and collaboration — in short, 
by making the whole country jointly 
responsible. Besides, between 1953 and 1956 
one continued to speak of the Soviet Union 
and its internal life in a way that was 
substantially identical with the past.
Between 1953 and 1956 there were neither 
public statements nor more profound changes 
in Soviet society and no real democratic 
participation took place. The responsibility 
for this must fall back on the Soviet leading 
group and the explanation is to be sought in 
its divisions, in the way the country had lived 
for so many years, and in the way its 
government was conceived.
A certain share of the responsibility 
regarding the Italian response in those years
Italian Connection 25
belongs to us, the Italian communists, 
because of the way in which we continued to 
represent the Soviet Union and for not 
grasping that those first signs of the post- 
Stalin "thaw" had to be better understood, to 
be matters of information and explanation. 
We are still feeling the effects of that share of 
the responsibility today in our party.
A quarter of a century later the problem is 
not one of celebrating a great liberating event, 
despite those who would consign it to 
oblivion. It is a matter of understanding why 
the change did not make way for a real and 
lasting process of democratisation and of 
development of Soviet society.
At first, the liberating elements of the 20th 
Congress seemed to be favoured by the 
existing situation. For example, there were 
real signs of a reduction in armaments in 1956 
in a situation which even included a kind of 
convergence between the USSR and USA to 
stop the Suez war. Also, relationships with 
other socialist countries were considered from 
a new viewpoint, with open talk of wishing to 
respect to a large degree their political and 
economic autonom y (even if 1956 was the 
year of armed intervention in Hungary).
In 1955, a year before the 20th Congress, 
Khrushchov had made his trip to Yugoslavia 
and repudiated the calumnies against the Tito 
"clique". There was an effort to facilitate 
relations of equality with the Chinese 
communists; there was the approach to Egypt 
and India. All this tells us what kind of 
international framework was sought at the 
time and which seemed possible in accord 
with the new elements put forward by the 20th 
Congress.
Inside the Soviet Union
Yet, as regards the internal situation in the 
country, the fact remains that the innovations 
remained largely disjointed and impulsive, 
never managing to tackle the problem of 
really democratising Soviet society in a 
coherent way.
•  Khrushchev before Lincoln's statue
For example, a reorganisation of the 
economy and its management apparatus was
•s
26 ALR
attempted on a regional scale (with economic 
councils) to break the centralism of the 
ministries. But in the factories, at the point of 
production, the problem of the participation 
o f  th e  w o r k e r s ,  th e i r  m o re  d i r e c t  
responsibility in management was not 
confronted. Behind the concept of "collective 
leadership" (which at first served essentially to 
hide the divisions in the leading groups and 
maintain a precarious balance) it was believed 
that a wider degree of tolerance could be 
maintained together with a large degree of 
party control over the police (until then 
practically all-powerful) to overcome the 
arbitrary way in which the system functioned.
Certainly, this relative normalisation of 
social life was quite different from the 
nightmare which had weighed on Soviet 
society for a long time. However, the fact 
remains — and today it is necessary to 
recognise it that such a normalisation 
retained some important aspects of the system 
of the preceding period.
Let us consider the flourishing of culture 
and literature which took place in those years 
of the "thaw". For example, Solzhenitsyn's 
book on the concentration camps One Day in 
the Live o f  Ivan Denisovich was published 
and praised. But that was due to the personal 
intervention of Khrushchov and not to a - 
different conception of freedom of expression 
and the right of citizens to communicate with 
each other. The struggle against the "anti­
party" group and the removal of Molotov, 
Kaganovich, Malenkov, Shepilov and others 
was carried out (and how could it have been 
done otherwise at that time?) by an appeal to 
the C e n tra l  C o m m it te e ,  w hich  was 
unanimous. But perhaps the Central 
Committee was not completely, but only 
formally convinced if, a few years later, it was 
to be unanimous in abandoning Khrushchov.
It was, however, a period in which new 
forces emerged, new hopes inside and outside 
the USSR were awakened and a revival of the 
world revolutionary movement was recorded. 
TJiis vehement demand for a new direction 
was made in an emotional way. (At the end of 
his speech at the 22nd Congress (1961),
Khrushchov called for the building of a 
monument in memory of the victims of 
Stalinist terror — a monument that was never 
to be.) If this demand for change was 
g r a d u a l l y  e x h a u s t e d  a n d  a l m o s t  
extinguished, it was due partly to the fact that 
Khrushchov did not have around him, nor did 
he seek, capable people disposed to follow 
him. But certainly not only for this reason.
Today we car. understand what we did not 
understand then; that it was not just a matter 
of penetrating some "degenerations of the 
system" (to use again Togliatti 's expression) 
but also those elements of the system which 
had permitted or, moreover, brought about 
those degenerations. In other words, what 
was never confronted was the very problem of 
the  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  so c ia l  p o w e r ,  
commencing with the factories, the local 
Soviets, through all the organisations of the 
party, up to the Central Committee, and to 
the Supreme Soviet. It was a matter of 
questioning also the way elections were
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conducted, to give citizens the chance — 
which they did not have and do not have 
today — of really choosing their own 
representatives and investing them with 
authority. This authority was not, and is not, 
recognised because it is not enough to have 
elections which are really a kind of 
installation.
So a quarter of a century later we should 
neither celebrate nor still less condemn the 
20th Congress, but try to understand how we 
can go more deeply into the limitations of this 
attempt to emerge from the nightmare of 
Stalinism. In this regard, we should again 
recall the position of the Italian Communist 
Party not only at the time of the 20th 
Congress but in the following years.
Facing the problems
Some people then talked (and some have 
gone back to talking) of Togliatti 's 
"annoyance" in relation to Khrushchov, or of 
his residual Stalinism. Certainly we all came 
through that experience and our behaviour 
then could be related to that tradition. But I 
think it is enough to refer to Togliatti 's last 
piece of  w r i t ing ,  the fa m o u s  Y alta  
M em orandum  (1964), prepared for a meeting 
it was hoped to have with the Soviet leaders 
(and of which he had informed the leadership 
of the party). This document was not 
concerned with protesting at the way in which 
the 20th Congress had revealed the crimes of 
the past and abandoned the method of 
presenting a too rosy picture of socialism.
The Yalta M em orandum  instead called for 
a more decisive following of the road of the 
20th Congress, pointing out the hesitations 
which were apparent. The problem of 
democracy was posed explicitly, as was the 
problem of relationships with other socialist 
countries in the context of the hostile gesture 
towards the Chinese in depriving them of 
Soviet technicians. From  that time our party 
initiated, although not always with the 
necessary incisiveness, an elaboration and an 
investigation of the problems posed by the 
20th Congress, and we have never abandoned 
it.
So we cannot go back, either with respect to 
positions taken then or still less with respect 
to those acquired in the course of time. If 
today, rather than celebrating that Congress, 
we prefer an historical consideration which 
also goes into its limitations, the limitations of 
the person Khrushchov, the limits of that 
"failed revolution" without heroes (also 
because many who perhaps could have been 
the heroes could not take part), we have to say 
that there was not the courage then in the 
USSR to talk more openly to the country, to 
allow the men and women to decide more 
freely, to give life to a real political 
democracy. "Gulash socialism" (this was 
Khrushchov's vivid expression) is certainly 
not something that can satisfy a people who 
have waited patiently; it is not for the General 
Secretary or the Politburo alone to guarantee 
it; the people must be involved in deciding on 
what kind of socialism and even what "dish" is 
to be on the menu.
The 20th Congress, even with its 
limitations, is now a part of history even if 
there are those who would like it forgotten. It 
is strange indeed that Pravda which published 
the Yalta M em orandum  word for word after 
Togliatti's death, replies to the Italian 
communists today, when we offer criticisms 
and point out errors and limitations in the 
policies of the Soviet communists, with 
phrases about the socialist reality which could 
have been copied from the captions on the 
rosy pictures of the Stalin epoch. When we 
say that the USSR of today is not the same as 
a quarter of a century ago, it is stating the 
obvious.
And if, in fact, things have changed, then 
they have changed so much that the 
contradictions today seem more glaring.
Things have changed so much that one 
cannot stand still, and what Togliatti 
demanded in 1964 on the eve of his death, 
with weighty words like "stagnation" and 
"delay" must now be demanded with new 
terms. When we say "phenomena of 
regression" it is precisely this that we mean.
Our words belong to those who have 
believed in the October Revolution, in the
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importance of the USSR in the Second World 
War and also, with that degree of utopianism 
that distinguishes the revolutionary, those 
who believed in the 20th Congress.
But today, our polemical position in 
relation to the CPSU is linked also to the 
conviction that crises are produced when
social forces cannot tolerate the burdens of 
the present and are not satisfied with 
comparisons with the past. The result is that 
the political inert ia of those responsible leads 
to a breaking point as much as does the 
just impatience of those who know that 
history does not stand still. I
Putting Victoria 011 
the rails •  •  •  •
— Julius Roe  interviews John Alford
Julius Roe interviews John Alford on the industrial strategy o f  the Australian Railways Union 
(A R U )in  Victoria.
What is happening to the Victorian rail 
industry?
A lot of very serious things have been 
happening to the rail industry in the past few 
years. Basically, you could describe it as a 
restructuring rather than just a cutting back 
or running down.
There are, of course, major areas of the 
system that are being reduced: those parts of 
the service that meet the needs of the ordinary 
people. I am talking about the passenger 
services, both suburban and country, and 
about the small freight services that are used 
by small business people in country towns. 
These services are all being cut back, staff are 
being reduced and, generally, such services 
are being run down and made more 
inefficient.
On the other hand, however, there are some 
areas of the railways that are receiving a 
boost. They tend to be those areas that meet 
th e  n e e d s  o f  l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  f r e i g h t - f o r w a r d i n g  
companies. Here we have seen new 
investments in track up-grading on the main 
lines between Sydney and Melbourne, and 
Adelaide and Melbourne. We have seen 
investments in major container terminals and 
in new freight vehicles. We are also seeing 
investments into areas such as bulk freight, 
and particularly grain, fertiliser, cement and 
the like; they are getting a boost.
So, really, what it amounts to is a shift of 
resources away from ordinary people towards 
large companies, and it is affecting staff very 
seriously in terms of their job prospects.
